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ABSTRACT~ Recent proposals by the G7 ( an d Russia) to clamp
down on "terrorists" and "terrorism" do not define that
which is prohibited . Ins tead , a t hreat is communica ted
which in turn allows, among other things, greater attention
to be paid officially to "camouflage" charities and
"terrorist" use of the Internet . Nevertheless, it is
s ome wha t of a truism to note that terrorist violence ~s
Ultimately de f i ned or characteri zed, f or purposes of legal
prOhibition, within a highly politici zed atmosphere .
Starting with a short summary of "anti-terrorist"
codification efforts made this century, this article
ex ami ne s some of the Nsecurity i n t er es t s " cited by
governments today in their respective struggles against
nterrorism. H More specifically, i t is argued that
individual percept ions of personal and societa l t hr e at are
heightened unnecessarily not only by a constant stream of
governmental nanti -terrorist n r he t ori c , but further, by an
awareness of official and un off icial methods of "anti -
ter rorist" survei llance, and the use to which the
i n f orma ti on so obtained can be p ut.
2I . Introduction
On 26 June 1996 , the G7, meet i ng i n Lyon I appr oved a call
from United States Pr e s ide nt Bill Clinton for a new
i nternational alliance to f i ght terrorist attacks . In the
words o f Pres i dent Clinton , t e r r or i s m i s
( T) he greatest sec u r ity c ha llenge of t he twent y-fi rst
century . ... • We c annot have economic secur ity in a
global e conomy unless we can s tand aga inst those
f orces o f t error ism . The U. S . wi l l l e ad the way and
we expect our al l ies t o walk wi th us hand i n ha nd . I
Prompted in l arge part by a spate of r e cent t e rrorist
a t tacks, t he G7 proceeded t o cond emn wor l d terr orism " i n
all its man ife stations regardless of i ts perpetr ators or
mot ives ." It was a greed further t hat " t e r r o r i sm is a
heinou s crime a nd the r e must be no exc use or e xception in
br ingi ng its perpe trators t o jus t i ce ." Al l coun t ries were
i nvi t e d t o join t heir efforts " t o thwart the act i vities of
t e r r o r i s t s and t heir supporters . "2
At a f ollow-up special ministe rial meeting on 30 July ,
~n Pa ris, t wo main t heme s were pursued : transport secur ity
and the threat of bombings. 3 Specific meas ures agree d t o
by sixte en G7 for eign and security ministers , and Russia,
include d t he e asing of extradition arrangements , a clamp-
down on terror i st use of the Internet and "camouf lage"
charities , and the establishent of "a directory of counter-
terrorist s ki lls" i n order to combat dif ferent t ype s o f
t e r r or i s m. 4 V.S . pr opos a l s t o i mpos e isolating economic
3and other s a nctions against states alleged to sponsor
t errorism received a lukewarm r es ponse , as be ing too
s i mpl i s t i c in view of r ad i c a l changes in the nature of
ter ror ism i n recent years . S
As c an be s e e n from t hese statements , no effort is
made to de f i ne t hat which i s pr o hi bi t ed . This i s perhaps
logical in t hat there is to dat e no general l y acce pted
defini t ion of t e rror i sm. On t he other hand , acts o f
t e r r ori sm may be characte r ized by t he f ear the y s pread.
The fear t hus ge nerated is t hen util i ze d to coerce c hange s
in pol icy or behavior , thereby shor t - circuiting pol i t ica l
processes which mi gh t othe rwi s e p r od uc e the same r e sult .
I f however an act of terrorism i s simply Ita he inous c r i me " ,
much of t he modern rhetor ic surroundi ng efforts to define
terrorism as a separabl e phenomenon appears insignificant. 6
Thus , what is communicated in these G7 stat emen ts i s the
existence of a danger to wor ld securi ty which must be
count er e d thr ough mutual c o-ope ration. 7
In view of t his absence of def inition , it is t he
pur pose of t his a r tic l e to explore the outlawing o f
"terrorist" act s of pOl itical v iol ence wi t h i n the context
o f var i o us of the "s e c ur i t y interests" a l luded to in t he G7
statements noted above . S The s tructure of thi s discuss ion
~s as f ollows . Fi r st , a s hort general background is given
of t he o r igi n a nd development of wha t toda y is r eferre d t o
as t errori sm. Ef f orts made this century to define
t e r ror ism, and to achieve international c o-oper a t i o n i n t he
legal prohibition and criminalization of non - state
t errorist acts, are then out lined bri e f l y. The
4contemporary e nv i r onment i n whic h anti-te r rorist laws are
increasingly being enacte d is t he foc al po i nt o f inquiry ,
and it is argued in pa r ticular that democratic gove r nments
he i gh t e n pe r cept i o ns of threa t , to national security for
example, to justifY t he use o f s uch "ant i-ter rorist"
dev i ces as o f f i c ial and unof f icial methods o f surveillance ,
and Inte rnet moni t oring . In t urn, this must r esult i n a n
inc rease in arbitrary const r aints on individual private
behavior .
rI . Terrori sm: Origi ns and Definitions
(a) The Origins o f a Word
The word "terrorism" derives from the era o f the French
Revol ution and the J ac ob in Di ctatorship , du ring which a
s t a t e - d i r ecte d pol icy of i nfl i cti ng t error was pract ised to
obtain polit i cal and soc ial control . As t he Revolut ion was
exported to the res t of Europe , the word gained
int ernational c ur rency in bo th domestic and international ,
i nd i v i du al and state , context s . I n turn , popular
res istance t o the Napoleoni c i nvas i on o f the SpaniSh
Peni nsu la l e d to a new concept of modern warfare - the
"guerrilla," which derives f r om t he Spanish word "guerra"
and trans lates a s " l i ttl e war ."9 As a weapon o f po l i t ics
and warf a re, however , t he us e of group terrorism can be
t r aced e a s i l y to more ancient time s.
For exampl e, b y the t welfth and t hi r t eent h centuries,
a gr oup known a s the "Assas s i ns" had a ppeare d . The t erm
"assass i n" derives from Arabic , and translates as "hashi s h-
eaters." The group were s ectar i an Mos lem fanatics, who,
5acting under the influence o f drugs , used murder as a
pOlitical weapon. The solitary ter r or is t actor , on the
other ha nd, a ppeared with the rise of t he nation-s tate. 10
Friedlander notes that the centralization of pol itical
struc tures during t he formative pe r i od of the national
state led to "a philosophic justifica tion for
individualized attacks aga i ns t • .. t he visible symbol of
the new statism" (us ua l ly t he monarch ) , as well as a gai ns t
abus es o f publ i c power , generally .l }
By t he mid-nineteenth c entury , many extradition
treatie s e xempted f ugi t ives accus e d o f " political offenses"
or "c r imes of a po l i t ica l c ha r acte r " from ext radi t ion. 12
The deve l opment o f t he pOl i tica l of f ense e xception
ori gi nated during the French Revol ut ion when France offered
sanc t uary to r evolut ionary di s s i dent s f r om other parts o f
Europe . 13 The decades f ollowing the Congr ess of Vienna saw
the growth o f a European-wide revo l ut i onary tradition .
Most We stern Eur opean governments we r e encouraged t o modify
their s t a nce on the grant o f asylum to alleged perpetrators
of political crimes. 14
Revolutionary ter r or i s m ac hieved its classic form in
nineteenth century Russia. While many commentators insist
that Mik hail Bakunin , founder o f radical anarchism , should
be considered the a r chetype of revolutionary terrorism, the
ana rchist movement was by no means t he only terror
organization which e ndeavor ed to transform Russian society
and government by assassination politics prior to World Wa r
1. 15 Revolutionary terrorism was also utilized as an
unofficial instrument of national foreign policy e l s ewhe r e
6i n Europe. For exampl e, the Union or Death Soc i e ty ,
popularly known as t he Black Hand, was a secret Serbian
revolutionary organization whose primary a im was to bri ng
about a Gr e a t e r Serbia. Its tac t ics include d t r ansnational
acts of assass ination , a nd the Aus trian Archduke Franz
Ferdinand was assass inated i n J une 19 14 by a terroris t
t rained by the Black Hand . 1G
Only t he conservative r eg imes of Pruss ia , Russ ia ,
Aus t r i a, and Naples continued during this t i me to advocate
that ideological ly similar nations s hould use t he i r
e xtradition laws t o help s uppress each other 's
revolutionaries . I? On the othe r hand , speci f ic protections
for Heads of State also began to emerge by the rni d-
nineteenth century . Related attempts e a r l y t h i s century to
organize an int ernational r esponse to t errorism were mor e
germane to immigration issues. Thes e included a protocol
c once r n i ng measures to be taken against the anarchist
movement, signed on behalf of n i ne states at St .
petersburg , 1 - 14 March 1904 , an administrative convention
f or t he e xchange of inf ormation concerning ind i v i du al s
dangerous t o s oc i e t y , s i gned a t Buenos Aires , 20 October
1905 , and an agreement concerni ng mutual defe nse against
undesirable foreigners, signed a t Quito , 10 August 1935 . 18
Cb) Early Efforts at Definition:
the 1 937 Terrorist Conv e nt i o n
A l e gal c omme nta t or i n 1933 i nd icated that it is more
desirabl e for t he world community to pros cribe and punish
certain offens e s t ha n to att empt a ny unific a t i on o f
7criminal law .l ~ By t his point ~n time , sever a l bipart i t e
agreeme nt s a lready r elate d t o the suppression of t errorism,
and many extradition treat i es contained clau ses exc ludi ng
attempts against Heads of St ate f rom t he list o f political
offens es. 20
On t he other hand , and wi t h particular regard to t he
political offense exc eption , it was al so noted i n 1933 that
"( t) he de f i n i t ion of thi s category tends t o bec ome broader
in a n era of exacerba t e d nationalism like the pr-eeerrt c v- !
This observation was made within the context of achie v ing a
s uff i c ient level of international c o-operation to e nsure
tha t domes t ic l egislation would permi t states to exerc i se
jur i sdiction over criminal acts whe rever t he y mi gh t be
committed . Nevert heless, there r emained two major
obstacles : fi rs t , d i ve r gence s o f l aw and proc e du r e between
legal s ys t ems are d i f f icu l t to reconc i le f or this pu r pose ;
secondl y , the full exc hange of i n f ormation in a " logica l
and j ust divi s i on among t he vari ous countri e s of t heir
sovereign jurisdiction to punish for crime"n is not only
di fficult to achieve , but c a n be e xpe nsive .
The assassinations of Ki ng Al e xander I of Yugos l av i a
and the French Minis ter f or Foreign Af f a i r s , appearing
toget her at Marseilles on 9 October 1934 , brought matters
to a head . The extradi tion of persons accused of the
assass inations wa s r e fused by I t a l y on the grounds that the
offense was political. The Counci l of the League of
Nations the n r eceived a memorandum f r om t he French
Government r e gar d i ng "international measures" f or t he
suppression of po lit ical c r i me s . The Counc il s e t up a
Bcommittee o f Experts to draft a Convent ion "to assure t he
repression of conspiracies or c r i me s commi tted with a
pol i t i ca l purpose . "Z3
On 16 Nov embe r 1937 , t he League of Nations opened the
Te rrorism Conve nt i on for signature . 2 ~ It was promptly
signed by the representatives of t wenty sta tes . Ar t i cle
1 (1 ) reaf firms the duty of "every state to refrain from any
ac t designed to enc our a ge terr or i st acti vi t ies dir ected
against another s tate . " Ar t i cle 1 (2 ) def ines "acts of
terrorism" as "criminal acts directed against a state ."
Suc h acts must be " i ntended or calculated t o create a s t ate
o f terror i n the minds of particular pers on s, or a group of
pe rsons or t he general public."ZS Ar t ic le 2 specifies the
act s wh i c h s ho uld constitute t error i s t c r i mi nal of fe ns es ,
in or der that e ach High Contrac ting Party cou l d implement
dome s t ic pena l l e gis lation . These Ar t i c l e 2 acts, in
s ynopsis , are as f o l l ows :
1 . wilfully c ausing death , grievous bodil y harm or
l os s of liberty to Heads of State , t he i r equiva l e nt s,
t he i r spouses , or other persons charged wi th pUblic
funct ions;
2. Wil ful destruction of pUblic pr ope r t Yi
3. Wi lfUl ly e ndangering t he lives of members of the
publici
q . WilfUl l y a t tempting t he above offenses i
5 . Manufacturing , obtaining, possessing , or supplying
arms , etc., for the commiss ion o f t he above offenses .
9Artic l e 2 i ndicates that the prosecution and punishment o f
v iol e nt pOl i tic a l c rimes turn on domestic inter pr etations
of the natur e of the vi ol ent act, as f o l l ows:
. .. (1)£ they ( t e r r or i st acts ) a r e direc ted aga i nst
a not he r Hi gh Cont racting Party a nd i f the y c onsti t ute
act s of te rrorism within the meaning o f Article 1 .
Artic l e 19 pr ovides:
The p r e s e nt convention does no t af f ect t he principle
t hat , provided the off e nder i s no t a l l owed t o escape
pun i shment owi ng to an omission in the cri mi nal l aw,
the characteri zation o f the various o f f e nce s dealt
wi t h in t he present Convention, the imposit ion o f
s ent ence s , t he me t hod s o f prosecu t i on and t r i a l , and
the r u l es as to mi tigating circumstances, pardon and
amnes ty are determi ned i n each country by t he
pr ovi s i ons o f domest i c law .
These provis i ons in parti cular a r e of interest because
t he i r precise wording a l lows a prosecuting state a wide
scope for di scr etion in inter pre t ation . IG The danger is
tha t a state whi c h refuses to int erpret an offens e as
c r imi na l for purposes of prose cution , o r to ext r adi te t he
a l l eged of f ender f or reasons o f sove r eignty or suspect ed
judicial in j ustice i n the requesting s tate , for exampl e ,
may f i nd itself accused of intervention in the i nt e r na l
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a f f a irs of t he r e qu esting state , and embroil itse l f i n a
situation of i nters tate f r ict i on .
Stat e and regional t r adi t i ons of asylum, and strong
national s ympathies may i nt e r j ec t political considerations
i n t o t he ana lys i s, ensuri ng t hat the po litical o ff ens e
e xception - or ot he r i nterpret at ional devi ce - remains
appl i c abl e. A grant o f asylum may also obvi ate the risk o f
pros e cut i on f or wha t c an be i nt erpreted as a pOlitical
offe nse . Fur t he r , a ny re fu s al t o extradi te, where ar guably
t he re ~s a clea r duty to do so , s till l e a ve s t he c us todial
s t ate with the duty t o prosecute27 , although this may be
conducted sympathetical ly .
Thus, the picture which eme r ge s in 1937 , and which
endures i n anti - terroris t , refugee, extradi t ion , e tc. ,
codif icat ions a like , is one of a communi ty of states which
i s rel uc tant to cede , i ndividually , i t s powers of s overe i gn
authoritat ive interpret ation f or purposes of co-ordi nating
characteriza t ions o f t he crimina l i ty of part icular act s i n
domes t i c l aw. As of 1 J anua r y 1941 , onl y I ndia ha d
r a t i f ied t he Terrori sm Conv e nt i on, a nd it never e ntere d
into force .
Ill . Contemporary Approaches to Terrorism
(a) Codification Efforts since 194 5
Ant i - t errorist provis ions are reflected in post-l945 human
r i ght s codi f ica t i ons , in me asure s t o protect civi l
avi a tion, and i n broader dec lar a tions s uch as United
Na t i ons Gene r a l Assembly Res ol utions , and t he Hel s i nk i
accords . 28 Be nchmarks ut i lized to i dentify t e rror is t acts
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withi n these many context s inc l ude ac ts suc h as t he wanton
t a r ge ting of innocent c ivi lians or their property f or
motives un r e l ated t o t he damage inflic ted . 29
Other commentators employ the l a nguage of warfare , and
an obvious characteristic of the post-1945 era has been the
attempt to regu late t actic s of t e r r or - v i o l e nc e deployed by
l i be r ation fighters util iz ing "direct action ."30 However,
while t he use of force in an armed confl ict strictly
speaking is a l r e ady regulated by i nternat ional humanitarian
law, an armed conflict must first be recognized , and i t is
largely for t hi s reason that much terrorism i s viewed as
perpetrated during so-cal led "pe a ce t i me .,,31 The negative
e f f e c t of such a view is t he spee t e r of the pOlitical
offens e except ion , which by its nature is afforded on a
country-specific basis , and threatens internationa l efforts
to co-ordinate measures against the use of terrorism.
There are essentially t wo predictors of the succ ess of
mutual co-operation i n terrorist mat ters: legal tradition ,
and pol i tical alliance. I n t hi s respect, the European
Conve ntion on the Suppression of Terrorism of 197 7, s igned
under the auspices of the Counc i l of Europe32 , and the
V.S. -U. K. Supplementa r y Extradition Treaty o f 198533 , are
of interes t . Both codifications were drafted with t he
arme d situation occurring i n Northern Ireland since the
late 1960s i n mi nd. Wh ile neither agreement attempts to
def ine terrorism, a nd each i s si lent r egar d i ng the issue of
armed conf licts f or self-determinat ion , bo t h agreements
l i s t s peci f i c o f f ens e s to be e xc l uded f rom the poli tical
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offense exception f or purposes of extradition , and t he two
lists are s i mila r . 34
The main difference between t he two is t hat the
European Convention is not an extradition treat y , and thus
is viewed as mer e ly providing a bas is for extradition.
Othe rwise, t he scope af forded f or discretion in determining
the non/ - e xtradition of an allege d terrorist offender
di f f e r s . For example , Ar t i c l e 3(a ) of the V.S . -U .K .
Extradition Tr e a t y allows ext r adi t i on to be denied if it
can be shown the i ndividual would suffer r elig ious ,
pOl i t i cal o r rac ial discrimination upon r eturn . However ,
as the two count r ies are sel f-styl e d "stable
democracies"JS, the accused ca r r i e s a he a vy bu rden of pr oo f
a nd he s t i l l , no doubt, will be pros ec uted. Articl e 5 o f
t he European Convention on the o t he r hand utilizes t he
formula of "race , religion , nationality or political
opinion ." Further , Ar t icl e 13 allows a Contracting Stat e
to declare that it r eserves the r i ght t o refuse ext r ad i t i on
for a ny of the l i s t ed t errorist offenses it considers a
"political offence, an offence connected with a pOlitical
offence or an offence i ns p i r ed by pol itical motives ."
Obvious ly , states which share the same or s imilar
j ur i dic a l sources may find mutual co-operation more
attainable. Similarly, offense-specific agreements have
be en more favorably rec e i ved36, generally speaking , than
global ant i -terrorist codif ications . Thus, the prospects
fo r success of t he I nt e r na tional Law Commission's current
pro ject under United Nations auspices t o develop a g lobal
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Draft Code of crimes against the Peace and Security of
Mankind is of int e res t.
The Draft Code is designed to deal, i nt er al i a , wi t h
war crimes , and genocide through a tre a t y f ormat . The
inclus i on o f c r i me s of inte rnational ter r orism rema lOS
co nt rove r s i a l, although the special r apporteur has p r oposed
s uc h crimes be r etained . This was a pr o ject comme nced
af t er World War 11 which s talle d during the Co l d Wa r . It
has recent ly been revived by t he United Nat i ons but doubt s
exi st as to i ts future a c cept abi l ity on any univer salized
bas is . 37
(b) The Dilemmas of Codification
A preliminary point regarding such g lobal efforts t o
c r i rn inali ze acts o f t e r r oris m as developed recently by the
G7 and Rus s ia i s tha t the effect i ve deterrence o f political
violence depe nds on i ndividu al domest ic state act i on and
i nterpr e t ation o f specif i cal ly de f ined act s. In tur n ,
ac hiev i ng such a h i gh l evel o f mutual co-operat i on in
ter rorist (or criminal) matters i s made problematic by
worl d disun i t y in other areas, such as human rights. For
example , an Is lamic faction may "terrorize" women who wi sh
to work outside t he home and to vote, or who do not wi s h to
wear the ve il . An e t hnic war may erupt i n whi ch torture or
murder a gai ns t innocent c i v i l i ans is practised as a matter
o f cours e.
A per cept i on t ha t state s c an only c ontr o l the
incidence o f t errorism , as we l l a s ris es in o r dina ry crime ,
through r epress ive internal policies wo r ks in a id of t hos e
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government s which crimi nal ize mode s o f indivi dua l behavior
pos i ng a threat to their pol i tical legi t i macy . 38 Moreover ,
variations between states in t he i r domes t ic def i ni t i on of
" t errorism" c onstitut e s evidence that the labeling process
i s a highly pol iticized one . As state pros e cu t ors ,
general l y-spe aki ng , ne ed only treat a particu l a r ter r or ist
al legat ion as a serious c r iminal matter , whet her, or how,
t he stat e proceeds r emai ns open . I n tur n, t he domes t i c law
in f orce , or t he interpretation o f i t by the relevant
aut hori ties , may prove i ne ffective when t he time ar rives t o
apprehend or prosecute " terroris ts."
It wil l be apparent by t h i s point lD t he discuss i on
t hat the many ef forts to def i ne and control world t errorism
thus depend to a certain extent on t he context i n which it
app ears desirable to c r i mina l i ze a proscr i bed act.
Fried lander 39 argues however t ha t
(E)ven though there i s no acceptable l egal defini t ion
as of t h i s date, t here need no t be i f one deals wi t h
t e rror i sm as a criminal act . Wha t ever the means a nd
however empl oyed, ac ts o f t e rror - violence are common
crimes i n every c i v i l iz ed soc i e ty on t h i s earth .
Ther e fore, an exact l e gal defin ition is no t necessary,
if on e mere l y deals with the eleme nt s o f t he act us
r e u s i n quest ion : murde r, serious bodi l y harm,
reckl e ss e nda nge rme nt , int entiona l inf l i ction o f
s eve r e menta l dis tress .
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Viewed in t his l i gh t, de fi ning prec i sely for pOl i tica l
or l e gal purposes what is (or is not ) an act of terrorism
l ose s much of its s igni f icance. 40 Put s imply, i f t he
i nhe r ent pol i t ical nature of ter rorism is i gnor e d ,
terrorist acts can be identified more easily for purposes
of prosecution. The s heer vari ety o f motives, actors,
arenas of activi ty, a nd target audiences, further serve to
c loud any attempt to d is t i nguish terrorist activi ty from
pure criminal acts , e .g' l for personal gaio . 41 It can also
be argued plausibly that defining "terrorism" t hr ough the
l e ns of i ts a llegedly "inherent" political nature is
practicably impossible. A definition which requires
evidence of an intent to spread fear ( f or whatever purpose)
by means of acts of violence is completely different , and
much more problematic f than a requirement of proof of an
intent to throw a bomb , for instance .
On the other hand, a simplistic approach t o the
identification of terrorist offenses implies that each such
offense must be specifical ly listed, which in fac t has been
the preferred formula of many anti-terrorist codifications.
The latter formula is also problematic for two reasons.
The first has a lready been discussed: states r e t a i n a
degree of discretion when deciding whether to extradite or
prosecute particular violent offenders, and terrorist acts
which have mixed "criminal" and "political" elements may
elicit a sympathet ic response f r om interpreting
authorities, and lead to a grant of asyl um.
Secondly, a government may exempt its elf f r om
prosecution for acts o f t err oris m perpetrated by its agent s
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in the course of of fic i al dut~l , whi c h of ficial ac t s may
in tur n p r ovo ke unl a wful "ter rorist " acti vity . Thus , while
mutuality of s tat e inte r est in the s uppress i on of
international terrorism is nec e s s a ry before assistanc e and
co-operation arrangements can be made workable , the scope
af forded to state discretion undercuts this mutuality ,
pa rticularly whe n political crimes are i n issue .43
IV. Terrorism and the Interests of Security
(a ) Situa t i ng ' Te r r o r i sm'
I nterna t iona l anti-te r r orist c o- ope r a t i o n is ac hieved i n
bo th bi - lat eral and mUlti - l ate r a l f orma t s which require
gove r nment s indivi dual ly to i mplement e xtradition and / or
anti-terr or ist laws r ef lec t i ng l e ve ls of dual criminality
for t he se purposes . 44 Nevert he l e s s , a po litic ized process
o f characterization and identification , whi ch exhibits both
t he dictates of domes t i c culture a nd the powe r relat ions
wi t hin it , are what lie at the heart o f much of the
effectiveness of state penal law i n gene r a l , and anti-
t e r r or i s t l aw ha rmoniza tion in par tic u l a r .
As no ted above , abuses o f pUblic power du ring t he rise
o f the na t i o n - s t ate led to a modern philosophic
justification for acts of pol i tic al v i o l e nce . Duri ng the
French Revol u t i on, r evolutionar y terrorists violently
seized a nd maintained social and political control . During
the late nineteenth and e a r l y t wentieth centuries ,
increased protections a f f orde d to Heads of State , the
regulation of the movements of "undesirable foreigners ,"
and the relative acceptance by states of the political
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offense e xception to prosecution or e xtradition indicate
t ha t broad l i mi t s of "per mi s s i b l e r e vo l utionary activity ,,45
existed.
I n r ega r d to the latter poi nt, i t is of central
inte r est to t h i s sec t i o n t hat We s t e r n governments in
particular have s truggled for centuries t o contain the
inc idence o f "terrorism" within stra tegic, and uti l itaria n,
pa r ameters . More r ecentl y , the Cold Wa r bet we e n U.S. a nd
D.S .S . R . strategic inte r ests ensure d sufficient non- co-
opera tion betwe e n them i n interna t ional matter s to permi t
cor r e s pondingly compe t i ng a n a lys e s o f the c auses of the
phenomeno n of intern a t i o nal t err or i s m. 46 Today, a nd as
reflect ed in t he G7 s tatements noted a t the begi nni ng o f
this d iscuss i on , a largely free marke t pos t - Co ld Wa r
environment still f i nds i t s el f presented wi th the t h r e at o f
terrorism, t h e d ifference now be i ng t hat t errori s m is
r e f err e d to a s "the great es t sec u r ity c hal l e nge of t he
twenty- f irs t c e ntury,,47 , and tha t "secu r i ty" a ppears
c o l lec tive . In other word s, world governments a ppear
pre pared t o "advocate . . , that i deologically similar
nations s hou l d use t he i r l aws . •. to help suppress e ach
other 's revo lutionaries,,48 once again.
This new shift i n pers pective may be du e to the f act
tha t terrorist violence i s st i l l characteri ze d as having
been crucial historicall y to cen t ralizations of , a n d sh i f t s
i n , i nterstate powe r relations. For e xample , revol utionary
t errorism and t e rrorist anarchism are depicted as rooted ,
f o r purposes of rationale , i n the oppress ion o f the working
c lass particu lar l y during the n i n e t e e n t h century era of
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Wester n indus trialization.~9 Af ter 1945 , much of the
literature on terror ism shifted to analyses o f t he sources
of f undi ng of Thir d World liberation armies (or "t e r r or i s t
bands " ) , as such groups s truggled against colonial
dominat ion and c apitalist imperialism . 50
Today , interpretations o f t he use of political
violence may be r edefined on ce again , part i cularly l D
relation t o modern issue-st ructur es such a s the
i nt e r national pOl i tic s of domestic s t ate pove r tySI, o r the
globa lization of sophi sticated commun i c a t i ons s ystems like
the Inte r net. 52 Howe ve r , p r oposed G7 and Rus sian co-
operation i n the s pe c i fi c form of measures s uch as a c larnp-
down on t errorist use of t he I nternet and "camouf lage"
charities, a nd t he establ i shment o f "a directory of
counter-terrorist ski lls"S3 , risks i nc r e asing levels of
t ole r a nc e t o violence by governments, terroris ts, a nd
vic timized populati ons a l ike , and i t i s t his l a t t er point
which i s now developed.
(b ) Terrorism, Labeling , and Communication
Each v i ole nt act pe rpetrate d by gun-toting, bomb-t hrowi ng
" t err ori s ts" suc h as Carlos t he Jackal , the members of the
Beide r -Me i nh o f gang , t he Abu Ni d a l Organization54, the
T.R. A. S5 , the P .L .O . Sb , t he rebe l gr oups fight ing un til
recent ly for Chechen i ndepe ndence57 , i nvolves the
destruct ion o f li fe or pr oper ty wit hout the s a nc tion of the
law. I n other words , e ac h ac t occurs beyond the penumbr a
of t he state monop oly on the use of force . 58 Thus , each of
the enumerated a ct s pOlit i c 90lly may be t e rmed "terrorism."
,
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As previously indicated , state identification of
" t errorist" groups or individuals, and the l egal
qua lif ications attr ibuted to their activities , depends i n
the final analysis on a high l eve l of political control
over the labeling process, as wel l as the effective
communication of this process . Thus, effective
communication through language use is very much at the
heart of both terrorist and ant i -terrorist activities .
Equally, it is possible t hat particular "terrorist"
acts are not criminalize d (or prosecuted ) by some
go vernments f or political rea sons . The V.S. defines
t e r rorism , for pur poses of c ivil r emedie s , for instance , t o
exclude dama ge c aused by wa r , by the V.S. , its officers or
t hose of fore i gn states acting with i n thei r o f ficial
capacities . Instead, " t e r r ori s m" is an act ivi ty involving
violent acts which: (1) violate U.S. criminal laws or t he
law of a ny stat e ; ( 2) appear to be int ended to intimidate
or coerce a c i v i l i an population, to influence the policy of
a government , or t o affect the conduct of a government by
assassination or kidnapping ; and (3 ) occur primarily
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S . . SY
Not surprisingly, this definition makes no distinction
betwe en acts of l iberation armies , v i o l e nt acts perpetrated
for personal gain , or violence related to psychological
causes, nor does this definition make justiciable in the
indicat ed manner acts whi c h might otherwise be viewed as
acts of terrorism where they are performed by U.S. or
foreign of f icials in their official capacities . GO Further ,
by viewing members of terrorist organizations as i ndiv i dua l
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j ur i d i c a l s ubjects , who each c a r r y i nd i v i dual penal
responsibility, formal egal itar ian polit ica l frameworks may
be maintained. This definition a lso appears to a l low t he
e xercise of extraterritorial jur i s d i ct i on .
Whether or not this particular U. 5 . definition
encapsulates and assumes the immuni ty afforded by the act
of state doctrine - which al lows in certain circumstances a
basic differentiation i n conduct between the behavioral
discipline and standards r equired of ordinary U.S . citizens
and that of state and federal officials, or their
representatives - the po l i t i c a l l y dominant class which can
exempt itself from prosecution in t hi s manner illustrates
the doubl e standard involved in the official power to
identify Ht e r r or i sts . H Put more p l a i n l y, and by way of
exampl e, the special pr otection a f f or ded to Heads of State
and other s t a t e officials by many terrorist codifications
means that "the creation of a specially protected class of
governmental officals has had the effect of legitimizing
all r egimes under the protective cover of anti-terrorist
statutes . ,,61
Any international harmonization of anti-terrorist
criminal s tandards by the world community is thus
e f f i c ac i ous for purposes of normalizing the concepts wi th
which participating states can identify and take action
regarding individllal "terrorists ." Moreover , this point
supports the notion that states sharing the same or similar
juridical sources may find mut ual co-operation more
attainable, and f urther implies a second l e v e l of
collectivist dua lity: "terrorist" i ndividu al s can be
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approached mo r e sys temati cally t hrough cont e xt s o f ( 1)
"bi nary di vis i on a nd branding" (good /evi l , right/wrong ) ,
and of (2) "coer c ive ass ignment , o f di f f er enti al
dis t ribut i on "( how t he t e rrorist is to be c harac terized ,
etc. ) . 62
Neverthe less, states c a n al s o depr i ve dissenters of
their voice i n t h i s normalized a nd s ystematic way63,
particular ly as acts of terrorism are capable of
interpretation in l anguage other than t ha t employed by a
government to describe measures necessary for the
maintenance of law a nd order. 6~ Whi le it i s not the
purpose of t his a r t ic le t o justify , or apologize for the
perpetrators of pOlitical violence , it has unfortunately
become something of a truism that generalize d officia l
rhetoric surrounding terrorism and extradition can obscure
equa l l y v iable arguments r e ga r d i ng " rights" e nt i t l eme nt s.65
In turn , the effective undermining of the potential
legitimacy of group-based claims t hr ough official
techniques which isolate or segregate t he voices of dissent
can exa c e r ba t e t he inc idence of violence .
Thus , an i ndividual ly-focused l e ga l and pOl i tical
proce ss which erases gr oup membersh ip serves t o insula te a
terrorist-targeted state f r om accusations of rights
deprivations . "Terroris t" agitators may counter perceived
government repression of t h i s kind with violent acts
f ol l owe d by j ust i ficatory verba l signals. 66 Moreover, the
use of terroris t t ac tic s ma y also r e fl ec t a group desire to
d isseminate a l ac k of t oler ance or impatience with
consti t u t i ona l proces s e s , a fu ndament al disagreement wi t h
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governmenta l goa l s tructures , or a desire to c r eate for
i nt e r na t i ona l cons umption the appearance bot h o f a viable
pOl i tical r ela t i ons hip wi th a target gov ernment, a nd a
competent, l egal exi stence .
(c) Governments and Force
Domes t ic l e gal no rms are used to regu late t he use o f
v iolence in a s ocie t y , and off i cial force i s the tool of
l a s t res or t, preferably , with which governments maintain
public order . Devl inG7 notes f or example that v iolence i s
of f i c i al l y authorized by t he l e gi s l ative and e xec utive
branches of government , is sanctioned by t he judiciary , and
is pe rpetra ted through po l i c y , the us e of t he mi l i t a r y ,
e tc . . Off ic i a l force is e fficient i n terms of t i me and
av ail able resources, and when use d , i t may be difficult to
mount a l e gal chal l e nge to it .
Violence is thus e ndemic to any c onception of modern
l awoR, and t he l e ga l qual ification assigned to an act
against which official force is used determines subsequent
assessment of r e s ponsibilit y and liability . Responsibility
for a terrorist act is determined by the legal
qualification at tributed to t he act by a t hr eatened
gove r nment, or i n some c a s e s a t hird s t a t e. Mor eover ,
assessments of respons ibi l ity for damage to life or
property i nt e r es t s resu l ting from t err orism (o r crime) have
po lit ical consequences. The adverse pOl i t ical consequences
whic h flow from ter roris t dama ge operate therefore i n
inverse proportio n t o the t rus t which a government s trives
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t o engender in its ability t o mai ntai n law, or der , and
economic stability .
Such "tr ust" in t urn 1.5 a func t i on of a government ' s
abi lity t o normali ze modes of indi vidual , di scipline d
condu c t - in other wor ds, to reduce t he risk of "criminals"
a nd "te r r or i s t s " dis r upt i ng c ivi l li f e . Giddens in
par t icular note s tha t " 'trust ' operates i n environments of
r i s k , i n which varyi ng l evel s o f securi ty , or protection
agains t da nge r s , can be achieved . ,,69 The tru s t placed in
an airline pilot to a rrive safely at t he desired
des t i nation i s illustrative of t his point , implyi ng f urthe r
that t r us t r e s u l t s from perceptions of r e l i a b i l i t y within
the c on t ext of c ontingent ou tcomes . 70
Mor eover , t rust in the operat ion of an individual
state public order system , a s expresse d through a decision
t o inve st f or e i gn capit al for e xample , provides s ome
ev i de nc e of a belief in the corre ctnes s (or at least ,
effectivene ss ) of the principles which unde rl i e t he
dome stic l e ga l norms used to regulate societal l evels of
violence generally, and, in particular, the eff icacy of
governmenta l us e s of force i n the event of civil d isorder .
Such f ore i gn inve s t ment "trust" can be the r e s ult of
government a ssurances to t his effect , as well as of prior
records of reliabil ity .
Nevertheless , a state which c an only enforce soc ietal
discipl i ne (and thus engende r "trus t") by enact i ng Qver ly-
repress ive l aws in areas of int e rnational intercourse s uc h
as i mmigration , asyl um, t errorism, and or dinar y c r i me r i s ks
the percept ion t hat i t cannot othe rwise protect cit izens
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and b usine s s interes ts . For insta nc e, the r eady use o f
mi l i t ary or po l ice for ce by states to c ontr o l domes tic l i fe
and politica l activity may t rans fo rm missions t o r estore
pub Li.c o r de r i nto low- i n t e nsit y war rare?" , and " r -ou t. i .ni.ae "
emergency s ituations, genera l ly . 71 Pe rhaps mor e
i mpo r t a ntl y for purposes of the present discuss ion, a ny
corr esponding refusal to hold o ff i c ial s or soldi ers
responsible or accountable f or a t rocities committed dur i ng
"peacetime" pubj i.c o r de r maintena nce rru. s s i.on af- fur t her
exace rbates the inter-state l a c k o f consensus regarding a
sat is factor y approach to i nter national terrorism.
I t s houl d by now be apparent that domest ic s tate
political processes and i nt e r state re l ations alike may be
hinder ed by a heavy-handed ma i nt e nanc e o f pu b l i c order .
Inter-pe netrations between the many l oc a l and g lobal
considerations implicated in t rade or human rights issues
further support the i mpo r t a nce of pro jecting an i ma ge of
reliability and t r us t wor t h i ne s s i n t he stabi l ity of t he
i nt e r na l order of e ach s tate concerned.
We s t e r n go vernments i n particular have tradi tions of
democratic l e git i ma c y to mai nta i n , but "the r api d ity o f
change in c ondit i ons of mode r n i t y ,,7-I , amongs t other
f actors, has meant t ha t resource s for these purposes a r e
concentrated i ncre a s ing l y o n mor e subtle mechanisms.
Control - through-survei llance, rather t han r e s o r t be i ng made
t o the more openl y-re pressive t actics o f military o r
t ot alita r i a n reg i mes, forms t he foca l point o f the next
s ectio n .
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( d) Trus t, Surve i l l ance, a nd Violence
Turning once again to the purely domestic s ituation f rom
whic h the "trust" just discussed arises , i t can be argue d
that control over individual activi ty produces t he
r e quisite i ns t i t ution al discipline t o attract i nve s t me nt .
By way o f corollary , s uch control carries t he additional
benef i t of potenti a l ly deterring c rime. As s tat ed by
President Clinton , " (w)e cannot have economic s ecurity in a
global economy unle s s we c an stand against those forces o f
terrori sm. ,,75 I n ot her wor ds, j us t as mil i t ary discipline
l e ads to rel i ability in arms, employable s ki ll s r equire a
"web o f workplace d .isc i p t i na vZv , a nd f r om d i s cipl i ne ,
surve i l lance over human ac t ivity f lows.
I n s imi lar vein, Gidde ns adds :
(A )dmi ni s t r a t i ve c oncentration depends . . . upon
the development of 'surve i llance' capacit i e s,
Su r veill anc e r e fers to the s up e rvision o f the
act i v i t ies o f s Ubj ect popu lat i ons in t he po l i t i c a l
spher e - a lthough its impo r t ance as a bas is of
administrative powe r i s b y no me a ns confi ned to t hat
spher e. Supervision may be d irect (as i n . . . prisons ,
sc hools , or ope n workplaces l, bu t more
charac t erist i cal l y i t is i ndi r ect and base d upon t he
control of info rma tion . ??
(T )here are c los e substant ive connec t ions betwee n
t he surve i llanc e operat ions of nation-st ate s and t he
a ltered na t ure o f mil itar y pm/er i n t he mode r n pe r i od.
The success ful monopo l y o f the means of v i o l e nc e on
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the par t. o f the modern state res t s upon t he secu l a r
mai nt e nance of new code s of criminal l aw, p l us t he
supervisory cont r ol of 'deviance. , 78
The r efor e , it can be argued plausibly t hat increased
powers of s urvei l lance ac tivi ty on t he par t of, a nd wi t hin,
industria l ized stat es transl a t e eas i ly no t only into
greater leve ls o f soc ia l control over ind i v idual life , but
f urther , into faci litat i ng the c riminal ization o f modes of
behavior which may constitute a dange r to t he " t r us t "
rU ling e l i t e s need t o at t r act . Reduc ing a "terTorist" act
whi ch a f f ects economic s t abi l i t y to a str i c t liabil i t y
c r i me , in which onl y the actus reus ma t ters , i s merely a
step away .7 9
Moreover , wh i l e i t is no t di fficult to view t e r r or i sm
a s a se parably i dent i f iable phenomenon on the bas is o f i ts
" inherent" pOlitical natu re , the wi despread diffusion by
go ve rnment and media of t he not ions of fear a nd
apprehension through many aspects of popular life and
c u l t ur e he i ghtens perceptions o f genera lized r isk , and
creates add itional conc ept ual s pace i n whic h governme nt s
can inte r f e r e i n da ily li fe . For e xample , the word
"terrorism" i s bei ng util i ze d emotive l y , r a t he r t han
i nt elle c tual l y , to describe the c ontent o f f ilm , the
mechanizat ion of modern banking , t he l inks be tween
i n f o rma t i on techno l ogy a nd c h i l d pornogr aphy, and soc iet a l
relations i n genera l . HO The negat ive economic e f f ec t s of
cons e r vat ism/ neolibe r ali sm a r e f ocus ed upon by s ome
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commentators as producing t he c onditions ~n wh i c h acts o f
t e r r o r i s m may arise and t hrive .RI
Assuming that Utrust" i mplie s an a bsence , o r
r e du c t i o n , of the elements o f risk within t he cont e xt of
cont i ngent outcomes82 , what becomes centra l t o inc r e asing
the l e v e l s of pUblic tolerance to of ficial (and unoffic ial)
violence is t r ust in gov e rnmental " peacekeeping ," i tse lf
sour ced in an ima ge o f r e l i a b i l ity, whe ther o f government
l e a d e r s , ope r ations s ystems , and/or i n t erna l means to
maint a i n o r d e r, and thus counter t h r e a t s .
Whi le t his l atte r po i n t i llustrates the e ff i cacy f o r
post-Cold Wa r governments o f e mplo y i n g coll e c tiv e l y t he
r he toric of danger and security , anot her concern i nvolve s
t he para l l e l e xplosion ~n gl obal communications . Te r r o r i s t
u s e of mecha n i s ms s u c h as the Internet is t h e SUbj ect of
recent G7 action . Neve rthe l ess, a more general ized
approac h t o aCces s t o i nformation mus t al s o be c o ns idered
f o r reasons wh i ch i n the fin a l ana l ys i s are e x a cer ba t e d by
pol itic ize d de f i ni tio ns o f t e r r ori sm .
For exampl e, globa l c ommu n icat ions f a c i l itate
mult i nat ion a l corpo r ate i n t e r e s t s as e asil y a s t hey do the
interes ts of international ter r o r i s t s and criminals , a nd
Sl oa n i n par t i cu lar e xpres s es conce r n that "the deve l ope d
democrat i c orders,, 83 are t he mos t soph i s ticated consumers
and man ipu lato r s of c omp uter a nd i n forma tional techno l ogy .
I n e x p loring the o rganizat ion and ac t ivitie s o f the pr iva t e
secu r ity f i rms wh i ch service c o rpora t e secu r i ty and
s u r v e il l a nc e capabil i ties , Sloan h ighlights t h e f a c t t hat
governments may be pursua ded to factor - in the sco pe o f
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t hese private fac ilities when calculat i ng the state
r e sources required to maintain l aw and order.
The capacity f o r ind i v i dua l government s t o gauge the
extent and ava ilabi l ity of a l l the security operations a nd
r e s ourc e s ava ilable t o t hem, i n order to subsequently
interpret wha t is a nd what is no t (or wi l l not be)
cons idered cr iminal and /or t e rror i st activ ity , lS t he n in
issue. 84 For example , should a government dra f t
legislat ion which does not e xtend similar forms of pUbl ic
scrut iny and contr o l ove r the activities o f p r ivate
security i nt e r e s t s as it does over its own law enforcement
and intellige nce communities , t he pr iva t e abi lity to
i ntrude i n t o , control, and t hreate n the social , po litical ,
and pri vate lives o f individual citi zens - a form of
psycho l ogi c a l terrorism - can go unc he c ked . Further,
whet her t he powe r e xists t o exte nd such l egislat ion extr a-
t e r r i t o r ially t o control t he security activities of a
multina tional operating i n dif ferent states i s unclear .
Converse ly, gover nments which do no t choose to over-
regu l a t e t he secu r i ty activities o f c orpor ations , o r of
private sec urity firms , can themse lves re ly on these
pr iva t e faci l ities to avoid public accountab i lity , which In
turn cons titutes a f urthe r r i s k to tradit iona l not i o ns o f
i ndividual l iberty . HS The ease with wh i c h private
i nt e r e s t s can conduct s urveillance ac tivities, and thr eaten
the personal security zones o f i nd i vidual s , and the ease
with which t he informa t ion gathered can be ac qu i red and
manipu lated by an empl oyer or "gove r nme nt agent al ike, means
t ha t any r esulti ng persona l i ntimidat ion c an be made high l y
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individua lized . So In t urn , t he c onnectivi ty o f e xperience
bet ween " t arge t e d " i ndividuals is broken . 87
The multinational corporation (or other interest
group ) which can utilize its informat i on technology to
e xert coercive control ove r cit izens in different states
t hr ough its acce s s t o and manipulation of persona l data may
also be o f great benefi t to a variety o f gove r nment s in
t hei r efforts collectively t o coerce modes of dome s t ic
o r de r and i ndividua l be havior . More over, client
gove r nments can bett e r obviate the r i s k o f communicat ing an
impress ion t ha t ph ys ical for c e i s required dome s t i cal l y to
ful f ill the securi ty obl i ga t ions of trade and other
inter ests.
The g lobal avai labil i ty o f survei l lance capability
carries e normous i mplic a t i ons when the time a rri ves f or
l e g i sla t o r s and inte rgove r nmental e xperts to co-operat e on
de f i n i tio ns of " t e r r o r i sm," and t o identify " terroris t s ."
In o t her words , wh i l e the ec onomi cally "undisc ipline d,"
crimi nali zed terror is t may be gu i lty of throwi ng bombs -
li t erally - f o r po l i t i c a l pur poses, his brother, t he
s ur veillance expert, may a lso r epresent a t hreat t o li f e or
property by h i s abi l ity to manipulat e and distort pe rsonal
information. The forme r receive s a p r i s on s e ntence . The
latter , because he works in further anc e of some s ys t em of
s upe r i o r power88 , rece ive s po l i c e protection, or , just a
l ac k o f legisla t i ve control.
v . Conc l us ion
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U.5. proposa ls t o i mpos e s anctions on terroris t -sponsor i ng
s tates were s i de steppe d by the G7 in l a t e July 1996 largely
on t he basis t ha t t he nature of te rror ism has c hanged
r ad i c a l l y i n recent years. 89 For e xample , whi l e
" terrorist" tactics have t o a certai n e xtent been assessed
traditionally aga inst f o rms of conventional war f a re90 , it
has now b ecome argueable that " t he boundar y be twe en
terrori s m and leg i t imat e r es ista nce,,9 1 encompas s es
per s pe c t i ve s which e xte nd far beyond t he more conventional
conf ine s o f physical f orce and mu rde rous violence. Th us ,
the secur ity considera tions not ed early in this
disc ussion92 c annot be confi ne d wi th i n c ontexts o f
literal i s m, by wh i c h i s meant a neutr al approach to solving
t he problem of po l i t i cal vio lenc e .
Chomsky on t he other hand ha s s tre s sed t he l imits of
the doctr i nal s ystem in whi ch defi ni t i o ns of "ter ror ism"
and "terroris t" a re r e stric ted to a cert a i n class o f
c r imi nal acts and ac t o rs . 93 Never t he l e ss , t he focal point
of t h i s di scussion has be en the f a c t that terrorist
v i o l ence is ultima t ely def ine d or characteri zed , for
purposes of l ega l prohibition , within a hi ghly pOliticized
atmosphere. In particular, legal def initions of t e r r or i s m
which encourage a government , t he media , or other specia l
i nt e r e s t group , to empl oy the rhetoric of danger and fear
in o rder to i nt r ude in the pr i va t e lives of c itizens i n an
unwarranted manner do nothi ng more than normalize societa l
expectations o f , and tolerance to , i nc r e a s i ng levels o f
s ocia l violence.
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The qu e s t ion whe t her t o mee t behind t he pot ted plant
i n cyberspace thus ne e ds r e fin ing . De spi t e t he sheer
nudity o f t he powe r r e l a t i ons through wh ich o ffic ia l
perspect i ves on t e r r orism have be e n c ontext ua l ized
histor i c a lly , t he mor e c ontempor a r y d i lemma o f how t o
(ad) dr e ss t he " t errori s t " during an elec t ronic rendez - vous
c l e a r ly exposes t he l e s s edifying end {s ) of democracy .
~ ,T. D . "Fo.rdharn) , LL . M. , r h .D . (Un Lv e t-s i t v of No t .t i.n qh am ) ,
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